The variation in KLP growth is then the sum of the variations in the rate of technical change and in the rate of change of the capital services ratio weighted by capital intensity.
in the distribution of output or employment among industries contributed to the slowdown in aggregate labor productivity?
The Analytical Framework For expositional convenience, the analytical framework is developed using Cobb-Douglas production functions. All numerical estimates derived subsequently allow factor shares to change over time and so assume only that the production function is well behaved and exhibits constant returns to scale.2 Output in industry i is Qi and is produced by capital services, KSi There is no direct observation of capital services, but there is data on the capital stock, Ki. The ratio of capital services to the capital stock is called KRi; its rate of change is expressed as The KLP concept is clearly similar to that of total factor productivity, which is widely used in the literature. I use the term KLP because the growth rate of KLP depends not only upon the rate of technical change, It is unlikely that changes in kri were in fact the same in all industries. One reason for differences might be differences in energy intensity. If much of the old capital stock has had to be replaced by more energyefficient capital, and if the measurement of the capital stock does not take this obsolescence into account, the measured capital services ratio will have fallen. This ratio will also have fallen if recent investment, and hence the measured capital stock, has been disproportionately devoted to environmental protection rather than production, or if an industry has had to completely retool for a new product line. One can look across industries to see if energy intensity or other information indicates possible causes of declines in the capital services ratio.
The term A\kri in equation 6 reflects any breaks in the trend growth rate of the capital services ratio, positive or negative. Instead of asking why productivity growth slowed down after 1973 one could just as well ask why growth was rapid before 1973. It could be that in some industries favorable factors were allowing the capital services ratio to rise before 1973 and that these favorable movements slowed or ceased after that year.
DECLINES IN THE RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Technological change reflects improvements in knowledge that are transmitted in some way to the production process-by organizational changes or by embodiment in the capital. Technological possibilities differ in different industries. Some are mature and have slow rates of growth and others experience rapid rates of technical change. The flow of new technology is taking place primarily in the industries with rapid growth. The different stages of maturity are illustrated below.
The slope of the S-curve in the diagram indicates the rate of productivity growth at different stages in an industry's life. An industry with a newly emerging technology is near point A. A comparison of time periods will show its productivity growth rate beginning to increase. A mature industry, on the other hand, is one that has already reached a point like C at the beginning of the sample period. A comparison of subperiods shows a growth slowdown, but it will be only slight. Industries that are intermediate between these cases show rapidly accelerating productivity growth as they move from A to B, and then stable but high rates of productivity growth along the steep portion of the curve around B. They show large slowdowns in growth as they move from B to C.
If the KLP growth slowdown has come about because there have been relatively few if any newly emerging technologies in recent years, most of the industries one observes will be beyond the inflection point B. Some of these industries were already mature in the 1950s and 1960s, and will show little slowdown. They were already at point C at the beginning of the sample period. Industries that were on the steep part of the curve in the 1950s and 1960s should show large slowdowns as they became mature industries. If the population of industries is dominated by firms in this latter part of their productivity cycle, it would indicate that industries that were previously growing rapidly are becoming mature Another clue about the source of the slowdown comes from the fact that a negative rate of technical change seems implausible. If there have been negative rates of change of KLP in some industries or in the aggregate, then it is unlikely that a decline in the flow of new technology is the sole reason for the slowdown.
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
Average labor productivity, ALP, is the most familiar measure of productivity. It is the slowdown in labor productivity growth that calls attention to the productivity puzzle. Equation 2 implies that (7) alpi = -yi + (1 -oi)(ksi-1).
ALP grows at a rate depending upon the rate of technical change and the growth rate of the ratio of capital services to labor input. Substituting 3 and 5 into 7, the change in ALP growth can be expressed as The slowdown in labor productivity growth is the weighted sum of the variations in the rate of technical change, the rate of change of the capital services ratio, and the rate of growth of the ratio of the capital stock to labor input. The difference between the ALP slowdown and the KLP slowdown is just the last of these three terms. If the ratio of capital stock to labor grew more slowly after 1973, the slowdown in labor productivity growth will be greater than the slowdown in KLP growth. Hence trends in capital formation may help to explain the labor productivity slowdown in particular industries.3
THE EFFECT OF DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS
When business firms vary their production as a result of fluctuations in product demand, there are corresponding variations in the intensity with which the factors of capital and labor are used. Labor services, denoted by L in the preceding discussion, refer to hours worked as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. During a period of slack demand, actual labor services, denoted by LS, fall before measured labor hours do because of labor hoarding and variations in work intensity. During a peak period actual labor services will be above L, as extra effort is given by the work force. When output is equal to potential output (denoted by Q*), measured labor input (denoted by L*) is assumed to be equal to actual labor services, or L* = LS*.
3. With more information, it would be possible to make more of the gaps between the ALP and the KLP slowdowns, because for any particular industry investment behavior is influenced by other changes. For example, an increase in the rate of technical change might stimulate demand for the industry's product by its effect on prices. This would stimulate capital formation. But capital expenditures could also be stimulated by some "adverse" event-such as a new regulation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)-that also leads to a decline in productivity growth. In practice the case that is relevant is difficult to determine.
Because capital is to some extent putty-clay in nature, it follows that capital services also fluctuate in the short run with output fluctuations. The preceding model has already distinguished between the flow of capital services and the capital stock, so that in principle weak demand could simply be one reason why the ratio of capital services to capital stock might have declined after 1973. But it makes an important difference whether the decline in output-producing capital services is the result of low industry demand or more permanent structural problems. The level of capital services achieved when output is at potential is denoted by KS*. It is the movements of KS* relative to the capital stock, K, that are of primary interest in understanding the slowdown.
In order to isolate the effects on productivity trends, I now modify equation 1 to allow explicitly for demand fluctuations. Actual output, Qi, and potential output, QO, are 
KS, Li
Demand-adjusted or potential productivity differs from actual KLP because of deviations of capital services from their potential level and because of deviations of actual labor services from measured labor input. Note that these capital and labor terms are not symmetric. A persistent recession, such as the situation that has occurred in the past few years, will leave KSi below KSP. But after several years of recession, one would expect Li and LSi to become equal as work practices return to normal and hoarded labor is eliminated. In the two-digit manufacturing industries there is a straightforward way of estimating KLP*. The Federal Reserve Board surveys manufac-turers and compiles capacity utilization estimates for each industry.4 As an approximation, the reported capacity utilization rate, CU, can be taken as an estimate of KSIKS*. The first step in forming KLP*, therefore, is to compute UKLP, defined as (12) In UKLPi = ln KLPi -(1 -oxi) ln CUi.
Here ln UKLPi stands for the first two terms in 11 and embodies the utilization adjustment.
To estimate the last term in 11, actual labor services are assumed to differ from measured labor input when output or labor input grow faster or slower than their usual rates. Two separate regressions were conducted for each industry to estimate this effect. The ln UKLPi was regressed on a cubic in time, representing ln KLP*, and each of two proxies for ln (LSilLi). In the first regression the proxy was the current qi and qi(-1), with means adjusted to equal zero. In the second regression, the proxy was 1i and lQ(-1), with means again adjusted to equal zero. Then two alternative estimates of KLP* were formed as ln KLP* ln UKLPi + estimated term for aiJln(LSi1Li)]. The two estimates of KLP* were then averaged.S Outside the manufacturing sector there are no similar measures of capacity utilization. One could try to impute such measures from labor input data, but this procedure was not used because it was found that whether or not the capital stock in manufacturing was adjusted for utilization did not result in major changes in the results. Regressions of ln KLP on the growth rates of output or labor input will pick up most of the short-run effects of changes in the utilization of capital as well as picking up the gap between L and LS. So for the major industries, regression results of the sort described above for adjusting for cyclical variation in LSIL were used to provide proxies for all effects of demand on productivity, including those coming from capital utilizations.6 4. The utilization rates were normalized to have a mean of unity. The Board has figures for only 14 of the 20 two-digit industries. Five of the remaining six industries were classified as either primary or advanced processing industries, and the utilization rates for these subaggregates were used. The tobacco industry shows little sign of cyclical demand fluctuations and so its capital stock was not adjusted for utilization.
5. The two estimates were made and averaged because either one alone has a potential bias. When productivity is the dependent variable, measurement errors in Q (or L) will result in positive (or negative) correlation between q (or 1) and the disturbance.
6. I also tried including the deviation of the actual economy-wide unemployment rate These fairly elaborate adjustments for demand were made because demand fluctuations have been large and their effects could have been important. However, the incidence of the slowdown across industries turns out to be quite robust to the form of the demand adjustment that is made or even to whether or not an adjustment is made. The inferences discussed in the paper were not created by the demand adjustment.
The Slowdown in the Major Industries
The productivity slowdown can be described for the different industries by three statistics derived from the preceding analysis: the slowdown in labor productivity growth, the KLP slowdown, and the KLP* slowdown-the KLP slowdown adjusted for demand fluctuations. Table  1 describes the productivity growth slowdown in the major industry groups of the private business sector using these statistics.7 The table indicates the following general results.
The slowdown is pervasive. Only one industry shows an acceleration of labor productivity growth and only two an acceleration of KLP* growth.
The KLP slowdown is smaller (in absolute magnitude) than the labor productivity slowdown in all industries except manufacturing and nonrail transportation. This indicates that outside of manufacturing some slowing of the rate of capital accumulation relative to the rate of employment from the natural rate in the adjustment regression to determine if it showed the effect of persistent economic slack on productivity in each of the major industries. The variable did poorly. Its coefficient was rarely significant and fluctuated in sign from industry to industry, so I omitted it. The estimate of the natural rate of unemployment used was from Robert J. The industries in the group with small slowdowns are not "smokestack" or heavy industries; nor is the industry at the top of the "medium" group-finance and insurance. They are basically white-collar industries, except for agriculture. There is no evidence of a permanent slowdown in agriculture. According to Barry Bosworth and Robert Lawrence,'0 fertilizer use was reduced after 1973 because of an energyrelated price increase. This could account for the temporary dip in productivity growth that occurred in 1973-77. Variation in the weather is the other main determinant of this industry's productivity. We know from common observation that transportation, public utilities, and mining are all heavily involved in energy as producers or consumers of it. And these industries all had large productivity slowdowns. But data are not available to test the role of energy in a more formal cross-sectional analysis of the major industries.
The slowdown in mining is probably not a mystery. One of the most important determinants of productivity in this industry is the natural resource base, but the capital stock used here does not reflect variations in the quality of that base. In the oil and gas mining industries the task of finding new reserves and extracting old ones has become more 10. Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, Commodity Prices and the New Inflation (Brookings Institution, 1982). difficult."I When the price of energy increased, it was economically rational to divert resources into this industry, lowering labor productivity computed with 1972 prices. Consistent with this view, in copper mining, an industry in which prices have been low rather than high, productivity growth accelerated after 1973.12 Public utilities are an example of an industry in which declines both in the rate of technical change and in the ratio of capital services to the stock are important. Innovation and scale economies were significant in the 1950s and early 1960s, but these gains had been largely exhausted by the late 1960s.13 As a result of the sharp slowdown in electricity and gas demand growth after 1973, substantial excess capacity developed in the industry; in 1979 there was a 36 percent margin of spare electricity generating capacity. 14 The Since it has been so hard to find satisfactory explanations of the productivity collapse in construction, data problems have been suggested as an explanation. One possibility is that material inputs are being overstated. If that is true, it is not legitimate to remove construction from the aggregate productivity measure because an overstatement of inputs there implies an offsetting overstatement in the output and productivity of industries supplying material to construction (unless these inputs are imported). In any case, recent data revisions have reduced the estimated purchases of materials, and I was unable to make the case that materials purchases are still overstated.
It has also been suggested that the rise in the deflator for nonresidential structures has been overstated since 1968. Since construction projects are all different, deflating this sector accurately is difficult. If the rise in the deflator has been overstated, however, it implies that real investment has also been understated. For example, if the error in the output deflator is such that construction productivity has actually remained flat since 1968, rather than falling, then real gross fixed nonresidential investment was understated by 9 percent by 1981 and net investment was understated as much as 30 percent. 16
AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Attempts to correlate the productivity slowdowns in major industries with measurable characteristics suggested by the model, such as capital intensity or previous productivity growth, were unsuccessful. At this level of aggregation, particular characteristics of the industries may dominate the results, and, as the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis stresses, the quality of the data outside manufacturing is quite poor. In addition, the importance of weather in agriculture may conceal other determinants of output and productivity; and the importance of rents to land and to mineral rights means the nonlabor share of income is a poor measure of capital intensity for examining capital obsolescence.
Thus The slowdown is pervasive; in only three of the twenty industries did labor productivity or KLP* speed up after 1973.
In over half of the industries the slowdown in KLP is greater than the slowdown in labor productivity, indicating that the capital-labor ratio actually grew faster after 1973 than before. This suggests that slow capital accumulation has not been the cause of the labor-productivity slowdown in manufacturing. This result comes about both because of fairly strong investment in manufacturing since 1973 and because labor input in manufacturing declined slightly between 1973 and 1980, even though it rose substantially in the private business sector as a whole.
The differences between the slowdowns in KLP and KLP* show that the demand adjustment reduces the magnitude of the estimated slow- 18. The equipment and structures data used for the two-digit manufacturing industries were supplied by Kenneth Rogers of the Department of Commerce. Rogers's data, unlike the Grossman data, reflect the 1980 revisions of the National Income Accounts. Rogers's data stopped in 1978, however, so that data for 1979 and 1980 were extrapolated using regressions on Grossman's series. down quite substantially in all the industries except electrical machinery and miscellaneous manufacturing. The decline in capacity utilization for petroleum refining was very important. This is a highly capital-intensive industry, and the demand for its product has dropped sharply relative to capacity. It remains the industry with the largest slowdown, however, even in terms of KLP*.
THE PATTERN OF SLOWDOWN IN THE

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
The industries can be grouped by the magnitudes of the slowdowns in short-run KLP*, as shown below. pothesis is supported. There is a distinct negative relation evident in figure 1. Furthermore, a simple regression of the slowdown in KLP* growth on the nonlabor share of income yields a t-statistic of more than 6. function for tobacco. This industry is inserted into figure 1 using a nonlabor share imputed from its capital-labor ratio. The second problem with using the alternative price index occurs because computers are capital goods. If the output of computers is being understated, then so is investment and the capital stock-the same issue that arose for productivity in construction. In the short run, an error in measuring computer output will cause KLP to be understated, too, because an extra dollar of computer output adds a full dollar to output immediately, while an extra dollar of capital reduces the estimate of KLP by much less than a dollar. Over time, however, the error in measuring the capital stock becomes cumulatively larger, since computers last more than a year. If computer output is being understated, the KLP slowdown becomes even greater and more puzzling as time goes on.
ENERGY USE IN MANUFACTURING
The effort to economize on energy following its price increases in the 1970s may have caused a decline in the flow of output-producing capital services relative to the measured capital stock, or it may have influenced productivity in other ways. Energy could be economized by reducing energy-intensive operations or by diverting resources to energy conservation from other uses. In the absence of more direct evidence on such responses, I analyzed pre-1973 energy intensity and an estimate of energy conservation actually achieved. I used the recently released data from the Department of Commerce that gives annual energy consumption by two-digit manufacturing industries for detailed types of energy for 1958-77.22 I divided the types of energy consumed into fourteen categories and then calculated a divisia index of energy use for each industry, using expenditure shares as weights.
The importance of energy was assessed by looking at the correlation between energy intensity and the slowdown and by determining how much energy has been saved. Energy intensity was measured by the ratio of expenditure on energy to value added in 1973, both in current dollars. Table 3 gives the energy intensities by industry in percent. There is a statistically significant correlation between the size of the slowdown by industry and energy intensity (a t-statistic of 2.1). But the association is not as strong as for capital intensity.
I am grateful to Joseph Correia of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industrial Economics, for supplying the data tape and assisting in its use. output, for all industries except three. This shows that energy saving was pervasive and is consistent with the idea that efforts to save energy contributed to the widespread weakness in productivity. There is no correlation, however, between the pattern of energy conservation by industry and the magnitudes of the slowdown by industries.
The fact that a worldwide productivity slowdown began shortly after the price of energy increased in 1973 makes one suspect energy of contributing to the productivity slowdown. And large slowdowns in industries that feel the impact of energy prices, such as public utilities, mining, petroleum refining, chemicals and transportation equipment, strengthen the suspicion. However, the examination here of the detailed energy consumption data by industry does not reinforce that case. These data make energy look more like an accessory and less like the prime suspect. More careful treatment of the behavior of energy productivity before the price increases might change the conclusions, but this is doubtful. The basic data just do not show a pattern of conservation that coincides with the pattern of the slowdown. It is possible that conservation patterns have changed substantially since 1977 or that environmental regulation has affected energy consumption (in the chemical industry, for example). Alternatively energy conservation may be easier in some industries than in others so that differences in the ease of conservation, rather than in the amount of resources devoted to it, may explain the difference in the conservation achieved. But these possibilities remain to be shown. These findings may be surprising given that it is frequently alleged that the increased size of stagnant industries has played a major role in the overall productivity story.28 Some people look at employment shares rather than output shares, but this is a misleading procedure. Think of an economy in which 90 percent of the output is produced by an automated industry requiring only one employee. What happens in this automated sector will dominate the aggregate productivity picture, but its employment share is trivial. Others look at total GNP, for which the growth in government and nonbusiness services may well have contributed somewhat to the growth slowdown in aggregate productivity.
Effects of Changes in Industry Mix
The second finding shown in table 4 is that the industry-mix effect associated with movements of labor among sectors with different levels of average labor productivity did apparently contribute to the slowdown in overall growth after 1965. The cessation of favorable mix effects contributed -0.22 percentage point to a total slowdown of -0.71 point, with the farm sector alone contributing most of the -0.22 point.
The contribution of changes in the mix term to the post-1973 slowdown is somewhat smaller and, of course, the slowdown itself is much larger. 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO INDUSTRY-MIX EFFECTS
The problem with the above method of evaluating industry-mix effects is that it is based on average labor productivity. The method implies that productivity gains can be achieved by reallocating resources as long as average labor productivities differ across industries. But in fact productive efficiency requires that the marginal products of factors are equated. If the labor shares are changing, so that the final term of equation 14 is nonzero, changes in labor shares will also be having an effect on alpi. If marginal products are equated everywhere, then small changes in labor shares will have no effect on productivity at all. The final term in equation 14 will be exactly offset by changes in alpi. This and other issues can be explored using a production function model similar to that used earlier: In practice, the profit share has fallen somewhat, both overall and within the major sectors of the economy, so that the data do not exactly fit the model. This may result, in part, from mix effects within the major sectors, and in part from an elasticity of substitution different from unity. Thus the fourth term in equation 19 combines the effect of the interaction between output-mix changes and capital accumulation with the effect of changes in the opportunities for capital-labor substitution.
The fifth term attempts to capture the positive contribution to growth resulting from the movement of labor away from farming, where 3 is the ratio of hourly compensation in the nonfarm sector to hourly compensation in the farm sector. This term probably overstates or puts an upper bound on the farm-mix effect because part of the wage differential in fact reflects a human capital differential.
The residual captures all remaining effects, which include the following: (1) efficiency gains or losses resulting from the reallocation of labor within the nonfarm sector, (2) efficiency gains or losses resulting from the reallocation of capital, and (3) measurement effects resulting from the use of base-year prices and errors in the assignment of value added among industries. Table 5 To summarize this section, it is preferable to calculate the effects of changes in output and employment shares from a model based on production functions that assume marginal products are equated, unless there is some specific reason to think otherwise. However, by either this method of calculation or by a method that keeps average productivities unchanged as industry shifts take place, industry-mix effects do not account for much of the slowdown in productivity growth after 1973. The remaining two suggested explanations of the slowdown in KLP growth were structural-a decline in the rate of technical change and a decline in the capital services ratio. The results in this paper do not reveal how much of the remaining slowdown in the private business sector might be attributable to each of these two and how much is left unexplained.
Conclusions
In earlier work I suggested some reasons why capital services might have declined. I pointed to the market value of corporate capital as an indicator that this had in fact occurred. In this paper I show that a general decline in capital services relative to the capital stock carries a clear prediction that the incidence of the slowdown across industries would be correlated with their capital intensities. For the manufacturing sector, this prediction is fulfilled. suggesting that a decline in capital services has been an important cause of the slowdown.
31. The average effects of the cyclical adjustments in table 1 were computed by forming a weighted average of the differences between the second and third columns. The weights were the 1972 output shares.
Comments and Discussion
William D. Nordhaus: Nobody in this room last year knew that there was going to be an international financial crisis, but I think everybody knew that there was a productivity slowdown. This paper represents another stanza in the profession's epic quest to understand that slowdown. Martin Baily has been one of the crusaders in this quest and, in this paper, reports some of the jewels he brought back from his sacking of the data banks at the Department of Commerce.
As an aside, it appears to me that there may have been some rebound in cyclically adjusted labor productivity growth in the last year and a half or so, with a pickup perhaps from zero to the neighborhood of 1.5 percent a year for nonfarm business. But that is an extremely short period and the slowdown is still a very stubborn and important unresolved problem.
Baily looks at a number of possible contributors to the slowdown. One idea that he does not find much support for is that the rate of fundamental innovation or total factor productivity itself has slowed down over the past twenty years. I have for some time thought that this was a reasonable hypothesis, but admit the evidence for it is flimsy. My suspicion that declining inventiveness may be an important factor rests on declining patent rates, declining R&D rates, and my impression that we have seen fewer fundamental innovations in the past ten or twenty years than in the early postwar period. I would make a somewhat different cross-sectional test than Baily does in looking for these effects. Assume the innovation process strikes industries randomly, like lightning strikes. A fundamental decline in innovation would mean that there were fewer lightning strikes. In this case, one would see a decline in the variance across industries in the rate 455 of productivity growth. I do not have the slightest idea whether that has happened or not. But the negative correlation through time that Baily looks for can arise from independence of these lightning strikes as well as from a decline in innovation.
Baily has added to the evidence that inadequate investment is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, as does Bosworth in this same volume. I think the issue is fairly well settled, although nobody except for a small circle of academics seems to be aware of the evidence.
The major new result in the paper comes from Baily' s capital intensity hypothesis. The idea is something like the following: the usual treatment of capital productivity or total factor productivity takes capital services as proportional to the capital stock or some variant of that. What if there is a decline in capital productivity so that the ratio of capital services to capital stock declines? If the decline is uniform across industries, those industries that have the highest capital intensity should experience the biggest productivity slowdown. Although Baily does not derive much from his major industry breakdown, I am struck by how much of the relative productivity slowdown across manufacturing industries is explained by their capital intensities in his figure 1. And I have never seen that kind of result before. Looking at the figure, it appears that a doubling of capital intensity is associated with something like a 1.5 percent a year relative deceleration in productivity.
The next point concerns the effect of interindustry shifts in output. There are no major surprises here. Baily confirms the view that shift effects cannot account for much of the productivity slowdown in recent years. Similarly, energy does not explain much of the cross-sectional variation in productivity performance. Again, I find it no surprise that he confirms other work showing energy is not responsible.
Overall, Baily has produced some useful new evidence on the productivity mystery. I am particularly struck by the capital-intensity phenomenon, and would recommend some hard thinking about its significance. Aside from that, I had come to the conclusion, before this paper, that the productivity slowdown is not a proper subject for macroeconomics, and he has not changed my mind. If one wants to discover the source of the slowdown, one has to look at the Boeing 707, the United Mine Workers, economies of scale, speed limits of 55 miles an hour, and kitchen remodelings. Technological change may be too unstable a process to find a representation in a conventional econometric formulation.
General Discussion
Martin Baily agreed with William Nordhaus that looking at the crosssectional variances of productivity growth in various periods might provide a test of the hypothesis that we are running out of ideas. He reported that the cross-sectional variances of adjusted KLP growth within manufacturing had not fallen after 1973, so the hypothesis was not supported. Baily also pointed out that an explanation of the slowdown that emphasized disaggregation and such specific things as the 55 MPH speed limit would have to account for the coincidence of so many industries and countries slowing down at about the same time.
A number of discussants suggested that the productivity slowdown might have to be investigated at a still more disaggregated level. Robert J. Gordon described two industries with which he was familiar and in which productivity gains had slowed-aircraft equipment and coal-fired power generation equipment. One issue illustrated by both industries is the consequence of running out of technological possibilities. A second issue, illustrated by industries such as air transportation that use aircraft equipment, is that the official statistics understate the productivity slowdown because of unmeasured efficiency improvements in their products through the 1950s and 1960s. Such improvements implicitly raised the true output of the industries in those years compared to the measured output. If unmeasured efficiency improvements have not occurred to the same degree in the 1970s, the mystery of the productivity slowdown only deepens. But William Brainard observed that such unmeasured gains could well be occurring now with the technological revolution in areas like computers and communications.
Alan Blinder suggested it might be especially useful to study industries with homogeneous products. Many industrial products such as envelopes, bolts, and coal are virtually identical in 1982 to their counterparts in 1950, so that looking at their production would avoid the kinds of measurement problems Gordon raised. Baily reasoned that such a focus would have a downward bias. Some of the industries with the most standardized outputs, such as the coal industry, have shown the largest productivity declines. And one would expect that the process of innovation would be faster in industries with new and evolving products rather than in industries in which products remain unchanged for three decades.
Despite the absence of any strong cross-sectional relation between energy and productivity in Baily's results, Blinder remained impressed by the fact that the productivity slowdown began in many industries and across many different countries around the time of the first oil price shock. He reasoned that producers in 1973 were probably familiar with alternative production technologies in the neighborhood of technologies then in current use, but were doubtless far less knowledgeable about technologies appropriate to the new energy prices. Even though similar relative prices had been experienced back in the 1950s, knowledge about energy saving technologies had simply "rotted away" from lack of use.
Lawrence Klein also doubted that the energy explanation had been clearly disproven either in this paper or elsewhere. The coincidence of timing described by Blinder was simply too striking to be entirely accidental. Moreover, despite Baily's weak results with industry crosssections, Klein believed that some of the largest drops in productivity growth have been in energy-intensive industries. He argued that one should look at industry gross output in measuring productivity rather than value added because the latter may be poorly measured as a result of price inflation; moreover, value added does not include the intermediate energy component and should be measured on a gross basis so that energy is included both on the output and input sides of the production relation. Baily agreed that gross output is better in principle, but said that the only available gross output data are heavily contaminated by intra-industry shipments. Klein also disliked Baily's assumption of constant returns to scale in the production process, reasoning that a more general specification of the production technology should be used, particularly in periods when capital utilization fluctuated so widely. Christopher Sims remarked that it was actually quite difficult to determine the energy intensity of an industry because in computing energy inputs one must take into account the energy intensity of all intermediate goods used in an industry's production process.
Barry Bosworth pointed out that, to identify weak productivity since 1973 with unforeseen obsolescence of capital, one would have to hypothesize large and continuing episodes of unforeseen obsolescence, not one major event such as the first OPEC oil price increase. Robert Solow observed that "divine providence" would have been the leading candidate to explain the productivity slowdown not so many years ago. While not taken seriously as an explanation today, a variant is worth considering. It is possible that we are now experiencing normal productivity growth, and that for a variety of reasons, including random error, the 1950s and 60s saw above-average productivity growth.
